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FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW-VERSYSS, INC. V. COOPERS & 
LYBRAND--THE NEW CORPORATE MERGER TRICK: WATCH 
CLOSELY AS THE TARGET CORPORATION MAKES ITS SECURITIES 
DISAPPEAR ... OR Do THEY??? 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1933, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securi­
ties Act" or "Act").1 The purpose of the Securities Act was "to 
protect the investing public and honest business" from fraud.2 To 
fulfill this purpose, the Act sought to ensure that potential investors 
received information relating to securities that might be purchased 
by the investors in interstate or foreign commerce.3 Since the en­
actment of the Securities Act, there has been a plethora of litigation 
on the definition of a security.4 The definition of security seems 
clear on its face,S yet in many cases the instrument involved does 
1. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1988 
& Supp. V 1993». 
2. S. REp. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). 
3. [d. The Securities Act focuses on transactions involving securities purchased 
from issuers, underwriters and dealers, and not on secondary transfers between parties. 
4. The cases address this problem by deciding whether a particular financial in­
strument falls within the definition of "security." See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 
U.S. 56 (1990) (questioning whether notes fall within the definition of "security"); Lan­
dreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (stock); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U.S. 551 (1982) (certificates of deposit); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 
837 (1975) (interest in state subsidized cooperative apartment corporation); SEC v. 
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (flexible fund annuities); SEC v. Vari­
able Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuity contracts); SEC 
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (investment contracts); SEC v. C.M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (fractional undivided interests in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1988). The definition of "security" is as follows: 
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires­
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, deben­
ture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any 
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certifi­
cate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust cer­
tificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, 
gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any 
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any 
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, op­
tion, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to 
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known 
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not easily fit within the definition.6 
In Versyss, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand,' the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit tackled this problem in ,the 
context of a merger. Specifically, the question presented in the case 
was whether stock certificates turned over by the target, or disap­
pearing, corporation in a stock-for-stock merger could still be classi­
fied as a "security" for purposes of finding liability under section '11 
of the Securities Act.s 
The majority and dissent disagreed regarding the effect that the 
merger had on the stock in question. The majority held that the 
stock that was turned over to the surviving corporation was no 
longer a security because the effect of the merger was that the tar­
get corporation ceased to exist, thus extinguishing any interest that 
was in the stock before the merger.9 The dissent agreed that the 
stock interest was extinguished, but believed that the language of 
the merger agreement actually gave the surviving corporation the 
right to extinguish the stock. Therefore, the surviving corporation 
had acquired the stock before the stock was extinguished.10 
The majority's view, while well established in existing state law 
precedent, creates a gap in the application of the Securities Act. 
Section I of this Note looks at the Securities Act and discusses the 
as a "security," or a certific{lte of inte~est or participation in, temporary or 
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub­
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing, 
[d. 
6.· See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
7. 982 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993). 
8. Id. at 654. The relevant portions of 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988) (section 11 of the 
Securities A.ct) read: 
(a) Persons possessing cause of action; persons liable 
In case any part of the registration statenient, when such part became effec­
tive, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a 
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements 
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved 
that at the time of such acquisi~ion he knew of such untruth or omission) may, 
either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction sue­
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; 
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar 
functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of 
the registration statement with respect to which ·his liability is asserted; 
(4) every accountant ... who has with his consent been named as having 
prepared or certified any part of the registration statement .... 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(I)-(2), (4) (19881. 
9. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655-56. 
10. Id. at 659. 
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reasons for its enactment. This section also examines merger law 
and its effect on the securities of a corporation. Section II of this 
Note discusses the facts of Versyss and explains the competing 
views held by the majority and the dissent. Section III points out 
the gap that the majority's deCision creates in the law and how the 
dissent's reasoning would avoid this gap. Section III also recog­
nizes the lack of support for the dissent's argument, and offers two 
alternatives which future courts can rely on to give strength to the 
dissent's argument thereby eliminating the gap that the majority 
created.. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Securities Act of 1933 
The main purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is to require 
full disclosure to investors so they can make prudent buying deci­
sions.ll President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed support for the 
bill ina message to Congress dated March 1933, in which he wrote: 
"This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the fur­
ther doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' It puts the burden of tell­
ing the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest 
dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence."12 
Following World War I, an enormous number of securities 
were "floated" in the United States,13· Approximately 
$25,000,000,000 worth of these securities were later found to be val­
ueless.14 This loss created great despair in many Americans' lives. 
Many of those who invested in these securities lost everything in­
cluding investments, homes, and confidence in the economic sys­
tem.15 The Securities Act sought to restore the confidence of the 
people by requiring the registration of securities sold in interst~te 
com~erce.16. The information required in a disclosure includes 
"items indispensable to any accurate judgment upon the value of 
the security."17 
11. H.R. REp. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). 
12. S. REp. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933). 
13. H.R. REP. No. 85 at 2. The number of securities floated was estimated at 
about 50 billion. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. S. REP. No. 47 at 2. 
17. H.R. REP. No. 85 at 3. 
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B. Merger Law 
The Versyss court faced the problem of the effect that a merger 
has on the stock of the target corporation. The precedent dealing 
with this type of problem appears to be well settled. The answer to 
the problem is that the stock of the target corporation ceases to 
exist at the consummation of the merger. 
Two cases, Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency. IS and Shields 
v. Shields,19 shed some light on this question. Both cases deal with 
the same type of problem: a right of first refusal. The phrase "right 
of first refusal" refers to a restriction on the ability of shareholders 
to transfer their stock.20 The restriction requires shareholders who 
wish to sell their shares in a corporation first to offer their stock to 
other shareholders of the corporation or to the corporation itself 
before selling to a third party.21 
In Frandsen, the plaintiff claimed that the corporation's major­
ity stockholders had violated the. stockholders' agreement, wpich 
provided that in the event the "majority bloc" offered. to sell its 
stock in the company, it would first offer the stock at the same price 
to Frandsen and any <;>ther of the minority stockholders.22 Jensen­
Sundquist ("Jensen") negotiated a deal with First Wisconsin Corpo­
ration ("First Wisconsin") in which First Wisconsin would acquire 
First Bank of Grantsburg ("First Bank"), Jensen's principal prop­
erty.23 During the course of lJ.egotiations, Jensen and First Wiscon­
sin structured the deal in two different ways. The second is 
irrelevant to this discussion except that it was done only to avoid 
triggering Frandsen's right of first refusal, which he tried to assert 
after the first deal was proposed.24 The first deal consisted of First 
Wisconsin purchasing Jensen for cash and then merging First Bank 
into a subsidiary of First Wisconsin.25 
The court found that the majority stockholders never offered 
to sell "their" stock;26 they were, instead, offering to sell their larg­
est holding, the bank, and not their majority interest in Jensen. 
18. 802 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1986). 
19. 498 A.2d 161 (Del. Ch.), appeal denied, 497 A.2d 791 (Del. 1985). 
20. 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOlTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 6.6, at 6-10 (2d ed. Supp. 1993). 
21. Id. 




26. [d. at 944. 
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First Wisconsin was not interested in becoming a majority stock­
holder in Jensen, it simply wanted to acquire the bank.27 
The court also held that "the transaction originally contem­
plated by the two corporations constituted a merger.28 Merger law 
in Wisconsin is similar to Delaware law in that it also states that the 
acquired corporation ceases to exist at the time of merger.29 With 
that in mind, the court stated, "[the majority shareholders'] shares 
would have disappeared but not by sale, for in a merger the shares 
of the acquired firm are not bought, they are extinguished. "30 
Shields31 involved a family business.32 The family members 
wanted to keep the business in the family, so they wrote a "right of 
first refusal" requirement into an agreement.33 The dispute in 
Shields arose when the business relationship between two brothers 
became strained.34 In order to circumvent the agreement, one 
brother merged the corporation with a newly established corpora­
tion through a stock-for-stock-merger.35 At this point, the other 
brother attempted to exercise his right of first refusal.36 This case 
arose" from this attempt to circumvent the right of first refusal.37 
The court came to a similar conclusion as reached in Frandsen, 
holding that the statutory conversion of stock of the acquired com­
pany in a merger did not comprise a "sale, transfer or exchange of 
that stock for purposes of an agreement among shareholders re­
stricting their power to transfer their stock."38 The court also con­
cluded that, at the time a merger is consummated, the stock in the 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1106 (West 1992). The Delaware statute will be the 
main focus of this Note because the court in Versyss focused on the Delaware statute in 
its analysis. 
30. Frandsen, 802 F.2d at 944. 
31. Shields v. Shields, 498 A.2d 161 (Del. Ch.), appeal denied, 497 A.2d 791 (Del. 
1985). 
32. Id. at 163. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 163-65. 
35. Id. at 165-66. 
36. Id. at 166. 
'37. [d. 
38. [d. at 167. In support of this proposition, the court cited Union Chern. & 
Materials Corp. v. Cannon, 148 A.2d 348 (Del. 1959). The Union Chemical court wrote 
that "conversion of shares by merger is not a transfer or assignment." [d. at 352. 
The court also cited Silversmiths Co. v. Reed & Barton Corp., 85 N.E. 433 (Mass. 
1908). The Silversmiths court stated that "there was no 'sale' of these shares of the old 
corporation to the new corporation." Id. at 434. 
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acquired corporation ceases to exist.39 
The Delaware statute authorizing mergers expressly requires 
that the merger agreement state "the manner of converting the 
shares of each of the constituent corporations into shares or other 
secUrities of the corp'oration surviving."40 The definition of the 
term "convert" in this context can be traced back to the Delaware 
case of Federal United Corp. v. Havender.41 This case dealt with the 
issue of whether the dividend rights of preferred stockholders could 
be extinguished by a merger.42 The court concluded that the divi­
dend rights, as win as other rights, could be extinguished in the 
event the corporation wasmerged.43 . 
In deciding this issue, the Havender court defined "convert" to 
mean "alter in form, substance or quality."44 The court viewed the 
conversion not as an exchange of one security for another security, 
but as an alteration of the stockholder's interest.45 The conversion 
did not occur at the time the stockholders turned in their old stock; 
the conversion took place upon consummation of the merger. The 
stockholder, therefore, immediately held an interest in the surviving 
company.46 
The conversion occurs because the stock certificate is only a 
representation of the interest that the stockholder owns; it is not the 
actual interest itself.47 .Theoretically, and assuming that statutes did 
not require shares to be issued, corporations would not have to is­
sue stock certificates in order for an individual to hold an interest in 
it. The certificates simply make identifying the stockholders easier. 
This allows the conversion of stock in a stock-for-stock merger to 
occUr as a matter of law, without any action by the stockholder. At 
the moment the merger takes place, the ~tockholder's interest is in 
the new corporation.48 
39. Shields, 498 A.2d at 168. 
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(5) (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
41. 11 A.2d 331, 338 (Del. 1940). 
42. Id. at 333-37. 
43. Id. at 342-43. 
44. Id. at 338. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See BALOITI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 20, § 6.4, at 6-7. 
48. 2 ERNEST L. FOLK, III ET AL., FOLK ON DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION 
LAW § 251, at 16 (3d ed. 1992); BALOTII & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 20, § 9.10, at 9-18. 
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II. VERSYS.s; INC v. COOPERS & LYBRAND49 
A. Facts 
. In May 1985, Continental Telecom, Inc. ("Contel"), a Dela­
ware corporation and Northern Data Systems ("NOS"), a Massa­
chusetts corporation, consummated a contract in which NOS would 
be merged into a new subsidiary of Contel (also a Delaware corpo­
ration).50 As consideration for the merger, NDS stockholders re­
ceived Contel stock.51 At the time the parties entered into the 
agreement, NDS stock was available for public trading. . In August 
1984, as part of a public offering of stock, NDS had filed a registra­
tion statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
("SEC") in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933.52 . 
On July 16, 1985, after the NDS stockholders ratified the 
agreement, NDS merged hito the subsidiary of Conte1.53 Contei ac­
quired ownership of the assets and the liabilities of NDS. Pursuant 
to the agreement, NDS stockholders turned in their NDS stock in 
exchange for Contel stock. . The agreement between the parties 
stipulated that "the 'separate corporate existence of NDS shall 
terminate."'54 
Following the merger, Contel realized that some of the finan­
cial information contained in the registration statement of the NDS 
stock was "materially misleading. "55 The accounting firm of 
Coopers and Lybrand had certified this information.56 Section 11 
of the Securities Act57 "imposes ... continuing liability for misstate­
ments or material omissions in registration statements."58 This stat­
ute provides that a civil action may be brought by anyone 
"acquiring such security" and the action may be brought against a 
certain list of persons and entities including an accounting firm.59 
Contel assigned the suit against Coopers and Lybrand to Ver­
syss Incorporated ("Versyss").60 Versyss brought the suit in the 
49. 982 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993). 




54. Id. (quoting the merger agreement). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988). 
58. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 654. 
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. See supra note 8 for the text of the statute. 
60. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 654. 
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United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.61 
Coopers and Lybrand argued in its motion for summary judgment 
that Conte I did not "acquire" NDS securities and, therefore, did not 
qualify as a plaintiff under section 11.62 The district court and the 
court of appeals acknowledged that Contel received something in 
exchange for the shares it gave out to NDS stockholders.63 Versyss 
argued that Conte I had acquired the NDS stock. . Coopers and 
Lybrand, on the other hand, maintained that the stock, as a result of 
the merger, was nothing more than an "empty shell" and thus did 
not qualify as securities under section 11 of the Securities Act.64 
The district court, following the latter view, granted Coopers and 
Lybrand's summary judgment motion.65 The Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit agreed with the district court's view that the stock 
was not "acquired" as required by the statute because, upon con­
summation of the merger, there was no stock left to "acquire."66 
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's summary 
judgment in favor of Coopers and Lybrand. 
B. The Majority's View of the Case67 
The majority began its analysis by examining the language of 
section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.68 The language of the stat­
ute seems very straightforward in that it cre'ates a cause of action in 
a person who acquires a security.69 Thus, the question the majority 
examined was whether Contel had acquired NDS' stock. To answer 
this question, the court looked to state merger law. 
The majority stated that, under state law, the moment the 
merger went into effect, "NDS ceased to exist as a corporation."70 
61. The district court opinion is unpublished. 
62. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 654. 
63. [d. at 654-55. 
64. [d. at 655. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. at 655-56. 
67. The majority opinion was written by Judge Boudin, and was joined by Judge 
Cyr. [d. at 654. 
68. [d. at 655; see supra note 8 for the text of section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 
U.S.c. § 77k(a). 
69. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655. The definition of "security" is found in the Securities 
Act at 15 U.S.c. § 77b(I) (1988); see supra note 5 for the text of the definition. 
The majority in Versyss found that the definition was not particularly helpful in the 
case at hand except that the definition called for a broad interpretation of the term 
"security." Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655. The court concluded that even when utilizing a 
broad construction, the term "security" had "outer limits, and those limits are strained 
badly by describing what Contel acquired through the merger as a 'security.'" [d. 
70. [d. 
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The court inferred from this that the shares of NDS stock ceased to 
exist at the same moment.71 The court also stated that the Dela­
ware and Massachusetts statutes supported this view.72 The major­
ity went on to state that: 
It follows that, when the merger became effective, NDS stock 
underwent a considerable transformation. At that point, the 
NDS stock certificates ceased to represent an investment interest 
in the separate assets of NDS (since it no longer existed), ceased 
to reflect voting rights in the management of NDS (since NDS 
ceased to have a management), and ceased to comprise a claim to 
dividends declared from NDS earnings (since no such dividends 
could be issued). In sum, for the NDS stock the essential charac­
teristics ofsecurities ceased to pertain. "[A]t the moment a stock­
for-stock merger is effective, the stock in a constituent corpora­
tion (other than the surviving corporation) ceases to exist 
legally."73 
The court then concluded that the NDS stock certificates which the 
NDS stockholders held after the merger were evidence that the 
stockholders were prior owners of NDS securities and were entitled 
71. Id. The court wrote, "in a merger the shares of the acquired firm are not 
bought, they are extinguished." Id. (quoting Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency, 
802 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1986». 
72. Id. The statutes are DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1991) and MASS. GEN. 
L. ch. 156B, § 80(a)(1), (5) (1992). 
The relevant portion of the Delaware statute is as follows: 
(a) When any merger or consolidation shall have become effective under this 
chapter, for all purposes of the laws of this State the separate existence of all 
the constituent corporations, or of all such constituent corporations except the 
one into which the other or others of such constituent corporations have been 
merged, as the case may be, shall cease and the constituent corporations shall 
become a new corporation, or be merged into [one] of such corporations, as 
the case may be, possessing all the rights, privileges, powers and franchises as 
well of a public as of a private nature, and being subject to all the restrictions, 
disabilities and duties of each of such corporations so merged or consolidated; 
and all and singular, the rights, privileges, powers and franchises of each of 
said corporations, and all property, real, personal and mixed, and all debts due 
to any of said constituent corporations on whatever account, as well for stock 
SUbscriptions as all other things in action or belonging to each of such corpora­
tions shall be vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from such 
merger or consolidation; and all property, rights, privileges, powers and 
franchises, and all and every other interest shall be thereafter as effectually the 
property of the surviving or resulting corporation as they were of the several 
and respective constituent corporations .... 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a). 
73. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655 (emphasis added) (quoting Shields v. Shields, 498 
A.2d 161, 168 (Del. Ch.), appeal denied, 497 A.2d 791 (Del. 1985». 
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to receive Contel stock.14 
The court sought to prove that Versyss' claim was not covered 
by the Securities Act by looking at another piece of evidence in the 
statutory language.7s It examined the damages provision of section 
1176 to establish that Congress did not intend to cover the merger 
transaction involved in Versyss.77 The statute provides that the 
measure of damages is to be the difference between the price of the 
security at the time the plaintiff acquired the security and either of 
the three followillgJigure!): "'(1) th~ value ... [ofthe security] as of 
the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such secur­
ity shall have been disPQsed of in the market before suit, or (3) the 
priCe at which such security shall have been disposed of after. suit 
but before judgment."'78 
The majority concluded that in calculating the damages for a 
section 11 violation, the securities must still be in the hands of the 
plaintiff-buyer.79 The buyer must purchase the securities an~ then 
realize the value paid was much greater than the actual value. Only 
then could the buyer bring an action for damages for the loss in 
value of the securities.so In the transaction between Contel and 
N"DS, however, the securities ceased to exist. "It would be fantasy 
to speak of the non-existent NDS securities as suffering a post­
merger decline in value or being resold for less than the purchase 
price."81 
The court conceded, however, that some formula could be de­
vised to satisfy a damages requirement in the case of a merger.82 
The United States· Court of Appeals for the First Circuit further 
realized that if Contel first acquired the NDS stock and then 
merged NDS into its subsidiary, there arguably could have been a 
claim under section 11.83 The same problem with the damage 
formula would have existed nonetheless because, under the major­
ity's analysis, the stock would still have ceased to exist at the time 
the merger was consummated.84 
74. Id. at 656. 
75. Id. 
76. 15 U.S.c. § 77k(e) (1988). 
77. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 656. 






84. See id. 
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The court concluded its analysis of the statutory language by 
giving its own reflection of the complainant's real underlying prob­
lem with the transaction. The majority concluded "that effective 
upon the merger [Contel] acquired a package ofassets and liabilities 
formerly pertaining to NDS that was worth less than Contel had 
been led to belIeve. "85 
The court next turned to the legislative history of the SecurIties 
Act to see if it would shed some light on the dispute,86 Its analysis 
of the legislative history led the court to believe that the Securities 
Act ~as intended to protect "ill-informed small investors," and not 
an experienced corporation which involved itself in a transaction 
that was simply not covered by the Securities Act.87 If ConteI had 
undertaken a transaction that deserved section 11 protection, the 
court stated that it would not deny recovery.88 However, the court 
was not willing to stretch the language of the statute to allow Conte I 
to recover. The court wrote as follows: "As the Supreme Court has 
reminded us, the federal securities laws were not designed to pro­
vide 'a broad federal remedy for all fraud."'89 
The majority then addressed what it felt was the plaintiffs 
strongest authority, the United States Supreme Court case of SEC 
v. National Securities, Inc. 90 The plaintiff offered the case "for the 
proposition that the transfer of stock in a merger is a purchase or 
sale of securities under section lO(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.c. 
§ 78j(b)."91 The court agreed that for purposes of section lO(b) , 
NOS did "sell" their NOS stock and "purchase" Contel stock.92 
The court then went on to say, however, that there was nothing in 
National Securities that suggests that Contel acquired the NOS 
securities.93 
The key to the anomaly-that a sale of securities may occur with­
out a purchaser of securities-is that the securities, although re­
linquished by the seller are never acquired by anyone because 
they cease to exist as securities (by operation of merger law) at 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 656-57. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the legislative history of the Securities Act. 
87. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 657. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.S. 551, 556 (1982». 
90. 393 U.S. 453 (1969). 
91. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 657. 
92. Id. at 657-58. 
93. Id. at 658. 
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the same time as they are relinquish~d.94 
The majority concluded its opinion by questioning why there· is such 
a lack of precedent on this issue. It pondered whether this lack of 
prior case law was a result of the fact that the acquiring corporation 
rarely relies on a registration statement put out by the constituent 
corporation, or simply because no one has ever thought to bring a 
section 11 action in this situation.95 The cpurt then conceded that it 
would not infringe upon expectations if it were to hold Coopers and 
Lybrand liable ..96 ,The court realized that accountants are held to a 
very high standard, but in this case the language of the statute 
would be stretched too far if the court held that Conte I acquired 
securities under section 11 of the Securities Act.97 "For us, there is 
greater conformity to language and less unease in concluding that a 
defunct security in a non-existent corporation is not a 'security' 
within the meaniilg of section 11."98 
C. The Dissent's View of the Case99 
Like the majority, the dissent in Versyss began its analysis with 
the statutory language of section 110f the Securities Act.loo The 
dissent particularly focused on the phrase· "acquiring [a] security" 
and analyZed the plain meaning of the phrase.lOl "In its plain 
meaning, 'acquire' means 'to come into possession, control, or 
power of disposal of often by some uncertain or unspecified 
means."'l02 The term "security" is defined in the statutel03 and the 
dissent noted that the NDS stock before the merger easily fell into 
this definition.l04 
Thus, the dissent defined the issue as whether the plaintiff ever 
attained "possession, control or power of disposal" over the stock 








99. Id. The dissenting opinion was written by Judge Torruella. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICfIONARY 18 
(1981». The dissent noted a similar definition of "acquire" in BLACK'S LAW DICfION­
ARY 41 (4th ed. 1951). Versyss, 982 F.2d at 658. 
103. See supra note 5 for the definition of the term "security;" 15 U.S.C. 
§77(b}(1} (1988). 
104. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 658-59. 
105. Id. at 659. 
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agreement offered help in answering this question and quoted the 
agreement at section 2.2. The agreement provided that "'each 
share of NDS Stock ... by virtue of the Merger and without any 
action on the part of the holder thereof, [shall] be converted into 
and exchanged for' Contel stoCk."l06 
The dissent argued that the words "converted into and ex­
changed for" signified that Contel had acquired the stock.lo7 The 
dissent posited that each corporation had, by virtue of the agree­
ment, purchased each other's stock,108The dissent further con­
tended that it made no difference that the NOS stock ceased to 
exist following the merger because "Contel acquired the stock prior 
to such extinction. Indeed, Conte I gained its ability to extinguish 
NDS stock as a result· of its acquisition."l09 
The dissent then proceeded to argue that such a reading of the 
statute furthers the purpose of the Securities Act.110 The main pur­
pose of the statute is to require disclosure so that business practices 
maintain a high standard of honesty. The dissent argued that 
whether there was fraud in a simple stock purchase or in a merger, 
the statute was meant to protect against fraud in both cases.111 The 
dissent's final note was one of concern: concern that the majority's 
ruling would lead to businesses structuring their transactions in the 
form of, a merger simply to evade the liability of section 11 of the 
Securities Act.112 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Majority's Decision: Creatin~ the Gap 
Section 11 of the Securities Act requires that, in order for there 
to. be liability, a "security" must be "acquired" by the party bringing 
suit.113 The majority in Versyss found that immediately upon con­
summation of a stock-for-stock merger, the stock of the target cor­
poration ceases to exist.114 Thus, it was impossible for Contel to 
have acquired NOS' stock because there was nothing left to 
acquire. 







113. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988). 
114. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655. 
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The court's analysis began with the language of the statute.llS 
Section 11 of the Securities Act allows any person who "acquired 
[a] security" that had a misleading registration statement to bring a 
civil action.116 Thus, the majority focused on whether Contel had 
acquired a security. In order to decide this issue, the majority made 
a very technical analysis of state merger law. 
In fact, the decision of the majority in Versyss was almost 
wholly based on its interpretation of state merger law.117 Its argu­
ment focused on the effect that a merger had on the stock of the 
acquired company. us Under Delaware merger law,119 the target 
corporation ceases to exist at the time of the merger.120 The major­
ity's interpretation of the law is that the stock of the company also 
ceases to exist immediately upon consummation of the merger.12I 
The majority looked to other evidence in the statutory lan­
guage to support its case as well. It found this evidence in the dam­
ages section of the Secllrities Act.122 In doing so, the majority 
pointed out a serious gap in the scope of the protection of section 
11. 
The majority contended that the damages section of the Securi­
ties Act provides evidence that the merger in Versyss was not in­
tended to be covered by the Securities ACt.I23 The court explained 
that the damages formula assumes the security is in existence at the 
time the suit is brought.124 However, it conceded that in order to 
calculate damages in this case, some formula could no doubt be de­
veloped, especially if the case involved Conte I purchasing the NDS 
stock first and then merging NDS out of existence.l25 In that case, 
the securities would also have ceased to exist, but the majority 
115. See supra notes 67-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the major­
ity's analysis. 
116. 15 u.s.c. § 77k(a}. 
117. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for the majority's merger law 
analysis. 
118. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655-56. 
119. This Note for the most part will limit its analysis to Delaware merger law 
because the majority focuses on the Delaware merger \aw. This is evident when the 
court in Versyss quotes Delaware law and in its citation implies that it believes that 
Massachusetts law would lead to the ·same outcome. See, e.g., id. at 655. 
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a} (1991). See supra note 72 for the text of the 
statute. 
121. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655-56. 
122. [d. at 656 (citing to 15 U.S.c. § 77k(e». 
123. See supra notes 75-84 and accompa~ying text. 
124. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 656. ­
125. [d. 
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pointed out that the "securities would have been 'acquired' and an 
arguable claim would exist under section 11."126 This considerably 
weakens the majority's damage argument because the court ac­
knowledged that in a similar transaction, a damages formula would 
have to be developed and could, in fact, be developed. Thus, the 
majority essentially rested its decision on its technical state merger 
law analysis and, in so doing, created a gap in the law. 
The gap in the law that the majority has created is that if a 
corporation purchases all--of the acquired corporation's stock first 
and then merges with the corporation, a section 11 claim exists; but 
if a corporation simply merges with the constituent corporation, 
then no section 11 claim exists. The end result is the same, yet in 
one 'case there is no section 11 claim under the Securities Act. 
The dissent tried to avoid creating this gap in the law with its 
view that the security of the target corporation in a stock~for-stock 
merger surVives long enough to be "acquired" by the corporation. 
Then, the security could be extinguished. While this view does not 
create a gap in the law, the dissent offered no legal justification to 
support its view. Thus, the question remains: is there any support 
for the dissent's view? 
B. Is There Support for the Dissent's View? 
The'dissent recognized that the majority had created a gap in 
the law, stating, "[t]heholding of the majority ... precludes the 
application of [section] 11 toany··merger like the one presented 
here, and thus allows parties to structure their transactions in the 
form of such a merger to circumvent the application of [section] 
11."127 While the dissent had the insight to recognize this problem, 
it did not offer much justification for its solution. 
The dissent simply considered the definitions of "acquire" and 
"security" and looked to the merger agreement to conclude that the 
merger agreement clearly allowed Contel to "acquire" the NDS 
stock. As a result, the dissent found that a section 11 claim ex­
isted.128 The dissent was advocating a new view of the effect of a 
merger on' the securities of the target company: the stock is first 
acquired and then extinguished, as opposed to being extinguished 
immediately at the time of merger. What follows in this section are 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 659. 
128. [d. at 658-59. 
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two alternatives that will strengthen the dissent's view and elimi­
nate the gap created in the securities law. 
1. Reconciling the Dissent's Theory with Existing Case Law 
The first alternative is to attempt to reconcile the dissent's view 
with existing law as characterized by the majority. The majority 
relied on precedent to the effect that the stock of a target corpora­
tion is extingui~hed immediately at the time of merger. The dissent 
framed the issue as whether Contel ever, even for an instant, "ac­
quired" or "gained possession, control or power of disposal of NDS 
stoCk."129 To deal with this issue, the dissent looked to the merger 
agreement.130 The dissent believed that the words" 'converted into 
and exchanged for'" sufficiently indicated that Contel had acquired 
the NDS stock.l3l Indeed, the dissent believed that Contel had the 
right to acquire the stock and extinguish it. 132. 
There appear to be two types of cases in which this type of 
dispute most often arises: (1) a dispute over the extinguishment of 
stockholders' dividend rights and (2) a dispute involving the right of 
first refusal. The first class of cases are easily reconcilable with the 
dissent's argument because the dissent believed that the stock in a 
merger was extinguished. State merger law says that when stock 
from the target corporation in a merger is extinguished, the divi­
dend rights of preferred stockholders are also extinguished.133 The 
dissent in Versyss argued that the stock ceases to exist after the sur­
viving corporation acquires it.134 Thus, the dividend rights would 
still be extinguished, albeit after the stock was acquired by the sur­
viving corporation. Therefore, the life of the stock could be ex­
tended by allowing the surviving corporation to first acquire the 
stock and then extinguish it. The result would then be the same 
because the shareholders' dividend rights would still cease to exist. 
The second class of cases is also reconcilable with the dissent's 
view. The right of first refusal accomplishes its purpose by requir­
ing shareholders who wish to sell their stock to offer it to other 
129. Id. at 659. 
130. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
131. Versyss. 982 F.2d at 659 (quoting the merger agreement). 
132. Id. . 
133. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
134. Id. "That the NOS stock ceased to exist following the consummation of the 
merger is of no consequence because Contel acquired the stock prior to such extinction. 
Indeed. Contel gained its ability to extinguish NOS stock as a result of its acquisition." 
Id. 
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shareholders before they can sell it to a third party who is not a 
shareholder in the corporation. 13S' A merger, on the other hand, 
results when one corporation is entirely absorbed by another,136 In 
a merger, there is never an offer to sell or to buy one particular 
shareholder's stock; the offer is to take over the entire corporation 
which includes acquiring every shareholder's stoCk.137 
The Shields court made the argument that if the right of first 
refusal could be triggered by a merger, then an anomaly would be 
created because each shareholder would have the right to buyout 
the other's shares.138 Both the Frandsen court and the Shields court 
concluded that this did not matter because the stock would cease to 
exist as a result of the merger.139 One could argue, however, that 
this merger analysis is not relevant to the right of first refusal based 
on the Frandsen decision.l40 
In a merger, one stockholder is not offering to sell his or her 
shares and the buyer is not looking to own that individual stock­
holder's shares. The transaction involved is a merger of a business. 
As part of the merger, as part of acquiring the whole business, the 
surviving company "acquires" all of the shares of the target corpo­
ration's stock. The right of first refusal would never be triggered 
because at the time of merger all shareholders are simultaneously 
giving up their stock to the surviving corporation. The surviving 
corporation, again, acquires the stock as part of acquiring the whole 
business. Once the stock is acquired, it is immediately 
extinguished. 
It seems as though the dissent's theory could be reconciled 
with the law on which the majority relies. The main problem with 
this alternative is that the law upon which the majority relies is well 
. settled. The court in Versyss even characterized this view as "ordi­
nary merger-law jurisprudence."141 The second alternative avoids 
this problem by circumventing state corporation law. Instead, this 
second solution creates federal corporation law. 
135. BALOTn & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 20, § 6.6, at 6-10. See Frandsen v. Jen­
sen-Sundquist Agency, 802 F.2d 941, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1986); Shields v. Shields, 498 A.2d 
161, 167 (Del. Ch.), appeal denied, 497 A.2d 791 (Del. 1985). 
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1991); see supra note 72 for the text of the 
statute. 
137. See Frandsen, 802 F.2d at 945. 
138. Shields, 498 A.2d at 168. 
139. Frandsen, 802 F.2d at 944; Shields, 498 A.2d at 168-69. 
140. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
141. 982 F.2d 653, 655 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993). 
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2. Federal Common Law or State Law? 
The majority in Versyss gave great deference to state merger 
law in deciding whether Conte I actually "acquired" a "security."142 
Since the inception of the securities laws, however, there has been 
much debate concerning the need for federal corporation law.143 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that in some in­
stances it may be necessary to disregard state corporation law in the 
interest of furt,hering federal policy.l44 
The first step in the analysis is to determine which law-state 
or federal-is involved in the dispute.145 If there is a federal statute 
involved, then courts should focus their efforts on providing ,a fed­
eral remedy. However, this does not preclude courts from looking 
to state law to fill in any gaps in the federallaw. l46 There are in­
stances in which the court should try to incorporate state law into 
federal law. One such instance occurs when the parties have "en-: 
tered legal relationships with the expectation that their rights and 
obligations would be governed by state law standards. . .. Corpo­
ration law is one such area. "147 
'The Court has recognized corporations to be entities wholly 
created by state law.148 Thus, there is a strong presumption that 
disputes involving corporations will be governed by state law.149 
"[I]n this field congressionallegislation is generally enacted against 
the background ofexisting state law; Congress has never indicated 
that the entire corpus of state corporation htw is to be replaced sim­
ply because a plaintiff's cause of action is based on a federal stat­
ute. "150 Therefore, the existence of a .federal statute 'should not 
impede the use of state corporation laws "unless the state laws per,. 
mit action prohibited by the Acts, or unless 'their application would 
be inconsistent with the federal policy u~derlying the cause of ac­
142. See supra notes 70-74 a~d accompanying text. 
143. See generally Arthur Fleischer, Ir., "Federal Corporation Law"; An Assess­
ment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965); Symposium, Federal Chattering of Corporations; 
An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.I. 71 (1972). 
144. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., 500 U.S. 90 (1991); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 
471 (1979); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 
430 U.S. 1 (1977); 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
145. Burks; 441 U.S. at 475. 
146. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98-99. 
147. Id. at 98. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 98-99. 
150. Burks, 441 U.S. at 478. 
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tion."'151 This test allows courts to limit the effect of state law 
where a federal statute is involved "and yet relieves federal courts 
of the necessity to fashion an entire body of federal corporat[ion] 
law out of whole cloth."152 
In a 1991 case, Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,153 the 
Court utilized this test to decide whether the demand requirement 
for a stockholder's derivative action brought under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940154 should be excused.155 The demand re­
quirement dictates that before 'stockholders can bring a derivative 
suit, they must make a demand on the board of directors and re­
quest that the board obtain redress from the corporation.156 The 
plaintiff in Kamen argued that under state law, her demand could 
be excused based on the demand futility exception.157 The court of 
appeals attempted to establish federal common law by creating a 
universal demand requirement which required demand to be made 
to the board of directors in all cases.15S 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. It first 
reasoned that even though the case involves a federal statute, the 
demand requirement is closely connected to the distribution of cor­
porate governing power and this power is inherently a product of 
state law.159 The Court stated that the futility exception dictates the 
situations in which the shareholder is allowed to bypass the board 
of directors and make a management decision about whether to 
bring suit.1OO "Superimposing a rule of universal-demand over the 
corporate doctrine of these States would clearly upset the balance 
that they have struck between the power of the individual share­
holder and the power of the directors to control corporate 
litigation."161 
Having decided that the demand requirement is a product of 
state law, the Court n~xt had to decide whether the futility excep­
151. Id. at 479 (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 
(1975». 
152. Id. at 480. 
153. 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
154. 15 u.s.c. § 80a-20(a) (1988). 
155. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 92. 
156. 2 BALOTfI & FINKELsTEIN, supra note 20, § 13.6, at 13-14 to 13-15 (2d ed. 
Supp. 1993). ' 
157. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 94. 
158. Id. at 94-95. 
159. Id. at 101. 
160. Id. at 102. 
161. Id. at 103. 
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tion impedes the purpose of the federal statute involved.162 The 
Court recognized that the Investment Company Act "embodies a 
congressional expectation that the independent directors would 
'loo[k] after the interests of the [investment company]' by 'exercis­
ing the authority granted to them by state law."'163 The Supreme 
Court could find "no policy in the [Investment Company] Act that 
would require us to give the independent directors, or the boards of 
investment companies as a whole, greater power to block share­
holder derivative litigation than these actors possess under the law 
of the State of incorporation."l64 
Following this analysis, it is easy to see that the rules governing 
mergers are also a product of state law. Each state has intricate 
statutes outlining the procedure for the merger of corporations. 
States include in statutes the effects that a merger will have on the 
corporations involved in merger transactions. Consequently, as in 
Kamen, it is necessary to consider whether the application of the 
state law in this case impedes federal policy. 
With the creation of the Securities Act, Congress sought to re­
quire full disclosure of information which would protect investors 
from fraud.165 The policy behind the Securities Act was to ensure 
that investors were provided with accurate information necessary to 
make an investment decision. Moreover, investors would not be 
misled into investing their money in an unprofitable enterprise.166 
The majority in Versyss took a very narrow view of who should be 
protected by section 11. The majority asserted that the law was 
meant to protect private investors against fraud and not to protect 
sophisticated corporations involved in a complex merger agree­
162. Id. at 100. 
163. Id. at 107 (quoting Burks v. Lasker. 441 U.S. 471. 485 (1979)). 
164. Id. at 107-08. The Court further wrote. 
where a gap in'the federal securities laws must be bridged by a rule that bears 
on the allocation of governing powers within the corporation. federal courts 
should incorporate state law into federal common law unless the particular 
state law in question is inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal 
statute. The scope of the demand requirement under state law clearly regu­
lates the allocation of corporate governing powers between the directors and 
individual shareholders. Because a futility exception to demand does not im­
pede the regulatory objectives of the [Investment Company Act]. a court that 
is entertaining a derivative action under that statute must apply the demand 
futility exception as it is defined by the law of the State of incorporation. 
Id. at 108-09. 
165. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text for the legislative history of 
the Securities Act. 
166. See supra notes 11~17 and accompanying text for the legislative history of 
the Securities Act. 
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ment.167 The court stated that "the federal securities laws were not 
designed to provide 'a broad federal remedy for all fraud."'168 
In making thi~.argument, the majority forgets that even though 
the party bringing suit is a· corporation, that corporation is repre­
senting its private investors. In taking on this suit, Versyss Incorpo­
rated is attempting.to protect the interests of its investors.169 Also, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress intended mergers of 
this type to be coveI:ed by the Securities Act. In its legislative his­
tory, the House of .. Representatives outlined transactions that 
should be exempt from the Securities Act writing, 
"[r]eorganizations carried out without ... judicial supervision pos­
sess all the dangers implicit in the issuance of new securities and 
are, therefore, not exempt from the act. For the same reason the 
[exemption] provision is not broad enough to include mergers or 
consolidations of corporations entered into without judicial supervi­
sion."170 Thus, even Congress reco·gnized the dangers inherent in 
mergers because of the exchange of stock and believed that mergers 
should not be exempt from coverage by the Securities Act. 
Furthermore, the majority's narrow reading of the fraud which 
Congress intended to cover with the Securities Act does not make 
logical sense in light of the Versyss court's arguments. The majority 
argued that section 11 was not intended to cover corporations in­
volved in this type of agreement unless the corporation fit into the 
language of section 1l.171 Thus, a corporation which purchases the 
stock of another corporation and then merges the acquired corpo­
ration into itself fits easily into the language of section 11. This 
corporation, however, is no more a victim of fraud than the corpo­
ration that simply merges another corporation into itself. 
This case differs from Kamen. In Kamen, it was not the merits 
of the plaintiffs claim under the Investment Company Act of 1940 
that would have been impeded by state law. The issue of which law 
to use-state or federal-focused solely on whether the plaintiff 
must make a demand on the board of directors for redress before 
filing a derivative action. In Kamen, the Court was not using state 
law to decide whether the plaintiff would prevail on the merits of 
167. Versyss, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 982 F.2d 653, 657 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993). 
168. Id. (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982». 
169. Versyss, Inc. was not a party to the merger but for whatever reason, it has 
been assigned the suit and must act in the interest of its shareholders. 
170. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933). 
171. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 657. 
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her claim under the federal statute. The Court simply used state 
law to see if the plaintiff had a right to have the merits of her claim 
under the federal statute examined in a court of law. There was 
nothing in the federal statute that directly addressed the issue of 
demand. 
In Versyss, on the other hand, by utilizing state law to interpret 
the federal statute, the court directly impeded the application of the 
Securities Act. The majority in Versyss used state law to directly 
interpret the meaning .of the federal statute. In doing so, the poli­
cies of the federal statute were thwarted. The Securities Act was 
enacted to protect against fraud and by using state law to interpret 
the merits of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff was denied protection 
from exactly the type of fraud the statute was meant to cover. 
Even the majority itself acknowledged the possible implica­
tions of its decision on the furtherance of federal policy when it 
wrote that, "applying section 11 to merger acquisitions might not 
unfairly upset settled expectations; under section 11, accountants 
are held to demanding standards when they certify registration 
statements and are liable to remote purchasers well beyond more 
predictable common law liqlits."172 In the final words of its opin­
ion, the majority in Versyss showed even further reluctance to reach 
its conclusion. The court recognized that Contel would have had a 
claim if it had acquired NDS stock in a tender offer and then 
merged NOS out of existence, yet would have clearly had no claim 
if Contel had simply purchased the assets of NDS.173 . The court 
went on to note the following: 
Faced with a merger transaction that fits neatly into neither cate­
gory, any construction of the statute will leave discontinuities and 
a sense of lingering unease. For us, there is greater conformity to . 
language and less unease in concluding that a defunct security in 
a non-existent corporation is not a "security" within the meaning 
of section 11,174 
Confining itself mainly to a technical analysis of state merger 
law, the court was not able to find that the surviving corporation 
had "acquired" a "security" within the language of section 11 of the 
Securities Act. Therefore, the Versyss court could have created fed­
eral common law in interpreting the words "acquiring such secur­
172. Id. at 658. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
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ity"175 and held that, for the purposes of the Securities Act the 
surviving corporation to a merger "acquires" the target corpora­
tion's securities and then the securities of the target corporation are 
extinguished. 
. CONCLUSION 
When the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
approached the issue in Versyss with a technical analysis, it may 
have neglected to consider the. future effects its decision might cre­
ate. At the basis of our legal system rests the notion that the courts 
should build on what has come before, that is, look to precedent, 
and make a decision, with the hope that the decision. will strengthen 
the law and aid future courts in making de~isions. In such a system, 
inevitably a case will come about in which the decision will create a 
conflict in the law that endures after it. Therefore; courts must take 
care to balance efficiency against caution. Courts must take extra 
precaution to ensure that their decisions will not adversely affect 
surrounding law. 
In Versyss, a gap was cr:eated in a federal statute through an 
interpretation of state law. This Note has offered two alternatives 
which would eliminate the gap. Whether these alternatives should 
be followed is also a question of careful balancing. Although the 
majority's analysis makes logical sense an~ is well supported by ex­
isting law, the majority seemed hesitant about its own decision.176 
Our judiciary possesses a tremendous burden to get the answer 
right in as little time as possible. But when judges close an opinion 
doubting their decision and writing as if they are settling for the 
best alternative available, it may become more important to ask 
that judge to step back, think a little more, and start all over again. 
William F. Giruzzi 
175. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988). 
176. See Versyss, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 982 F.2d 653, 658 (1st Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993). 
